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It is a commonly held view that “there is a crucial barrier between computer models of
minds and real minds: the barrier of consciousness” and thus that information-processing
and the conscious experience of raw sensations1 are conceptually distinct [12]. Indeed,
Cartesian theories typically describe cognition in terms of its objective and subjective as-
pects, so breaking down the ‘problem of mind’ into what David Chalmers [7] calls the
‘easy’ problem of perception - the classification, identification and processing of sensory
(and concomitant neural) states - and a corresponding ‘hard’ problem, which is the real-
ization of the associated raw phenomenal experience of sensation. The difference between
the easy and the hard problems - and the apparent lack of a link between theories of the
former and an account of the latter - has been termed the ‘explanatory-gap’.
But is consciousness experience a necessary prerequisite for the realisation of cognition
and genuine mental states in all entities - both natural and artificial? John Searle suggests
that it is, “.. the study of the mind is the study of consciousness, in much the same
sense that biology is the study of life” [11] and this observation leads Searle to outline a
‘connection principle’ whereby “... any mental state must be, at least in principle, capable
of being brought to conscious awareness’ ’ (ibid).
Yet is such conscious experience also necessary for an entity to be considered ‘creative’
and, furthermore, can a mere computing machine (qua computation) ever aspire to realise
consciousness, in all its beautiful and terrifying grandeur?
Certainly across the realms of science and science fiction the hope is periodically reignited
that a computational system will one day be conscious in virtue of its execution of an
appropriate program; thus in 2004 the UK funding body EPSRC awarded a substantial
‘Adventure Fund’ grant to a team of Roboteers and Psychologists at Essex and Bristol
led by Owen Holland, with a goal of instantiating consciousness in a humanoid-like robot
called Cronos.
But equally, the view that the mere execution of a computer program can bring forth
consciousness has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, one argument that I have developed,
which questions the very possibility of such a machine consciousness, is the ‘Dancing with
Pixies’ (DwP) thought experiment [2], [3], [4] &[5].
1The term ‘consciousness’ can imply many things to different people; in the context of this essay I
specifically mean that aspect of consciousness Ned Block terms ‘phenomenal consciousness’ [6] and by this
I specifically refer to the first person, subjective phenomenal sensations: pains, smells, the ineffable red of
a rose, and so on.
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Baldly speaking DwP is a simple reductio ad absurdum argument to demonstrate that:
• IF the assumed claim – that an appropriately programmed computer really does
instantiate genuine phenomenal states – is true;
• THEN panpsychism – the view that all matter has consciousness – is true.
However if, against the backdrop of our scientific knowledge of the closed physical world
and the corresponding desire to explain everything ultimately in physical terms, we are led
to reject panpsychism, then the DwP reductio suggests computational processes cannot
instantiate phenomenal consciousness and computational accounts of cognitive processes
must, at best, exhibit what John Searle termed weak artificial intelligence; a so called ‘weak
AI’.
Weak AI does not aim beyond engineering the mere simulation of [human] intelligent
behaviour; strong AI, in contrast, takes seriously the idea that one day machines will be
built that really can think (be conscious, have ‘genuine’ understanding and other cognitive
states) purely in virtue of their execution of a particular computer program [10].
Furthermore, taken alongside the Chinese Room Argument (CRA)2 - Searle’s famous
critique of strong AI and machine understanding (ibid) - I suggest the DwP reductio places
bounds on the successes of any mere computationally powered creativity project because,
if Searle and I are correct, no purely computational engine can ever genuinely feel or
understand anything of the world nor, indeed, anything of its own ‘creative response’ to
that world (nor the world’s response to it).
Thus, echoing Searle’s taxonomy of Artificial Intelligence, Mohammad Majid al-Rifaie
and I have suggested a dual taxonomy of ‘computationally creative systems’: a weak
notion, which does not go beyond exploring the simulation of [human] creative processes;
emphasising that any creativity so exhibited springs forth from the interaction of man
and machine (and fundamentally remains the responsibility of the human) and a strong
notion, in which the expectation is that the underlying creative system is autonomous,
autopoietic and conscious, with ‘genuine understanding’ and other cognitive states [1].
That said, of course there always remains a trivial sense in which every time we run any
computer program the machine is in some sense ‘computationally creative’, as symbols and
patterns that, perhaps, have not previously been output together (say as a novel image)
are cranked forth into the world; as Newell and Simon [9] famously observed back in 1973:
Computer science is an empirical discipline. We would have called it an
experimental science, but like astronomy, economics and geology, some of
its unique forms of observation and experience do not fit a narrow stereotype
of the experimental method. None the less, they are experiments. Each new
machine that is built is an experiment. Actually constructing the machine
poses a question to nature; and we listen for the answer by observing the
machine in operation and analyzing it by all analytical and measurement
means available.
2The Chinese Room Argument is John Searle’s (in)famous critique of strong AI and machine under-
standing [10]; if correct Searle has demonstrated that ‘syntax is not sufficient for semantics’ and hence that
computational systems can never genuinely ‘understand’ the symbols they so powerfully manipulate.
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However, lacking autonomous teleology, contextualisation and intent, even this modest
conception of a [computational] creative process is merely analogous to a ballistic throw of
a dice3, soliciting only the faintest echo of ‘creativity’ as the word is more usually employed.
Viewed under a modern conception of creativity - as a process positioned within a
reflective historical lineage - such reflections inexorably prompt us to question in what
sense any computational system could ever be seriously described as strongly creative (and
not simply as a tool, an accelerator, to its programmers own vivid imaginings) ..
Indeed, in his recent address to open AISB50 (the 50th anniversary conference of the
UK society for Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour), Harold Cohen,
the British-born artist well known as the creator of AARON (a computer program often
claimed to produce art ‘autonomously’) retreated from this very shibboleth by electing
to describe his own work merely in terms of interactive collaborations between man and
machine.
Hence, in the light of these concerns - and until the challenges of the CRA and DwP have
been fully addressed and the role of the mind’s embodiment strongly engaged - I suggest a
note of caution in labelling any computational system as ‘strongly creative’; any creativity
displayed therein being simply a projection of its engineer’s intellect, aesthetic judgement
and desire.
References
[1] al-Rifaie, M.M., & Bishop, J.M., (2014), ‘Weak and Strong Computational Creativity’ by in Besold &
Smaill, “Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines”, (forthcoming 2014)
[2] Bishop J.M. (2002) Dancing with Pixies: strong artificial intelligence and panpyschism. in: Preston J,
Bishop JM (Eds), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
[3] Bishop, J.M., (2005), ‘Can computers feel?’, The AISB Quarterly (199): 6, The AISB, UK.
[4] Bishop, J.M., (2009) Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain. Minds and Machines 19(4): 507-516.
[5] Bishop, J.M., (2009) A Cognitive Computation fallacy? Cognition, computations and panpsychism.
Cognitive Computation 1(3): 221-233.
[6] Block N. On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness. In: Block N, Flanagan O, Guzeldere G,
editors. The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge MA: MIT Press; 1997.
[7] Chalmers, D.J., (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[8] Nasuto, S.J., Bishop, J.M., Roesch, E., Spencer, M., (2014), Zombie mouse in a Chinese room. Philoso-
phy & Technology pp. 115. DOI 10.1007/s13347-014-0150-2. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-
0150-2.
[9] Newell, A. & Simon, H.A., (1973), Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry: Symbols and Search,
Communications of the ACM 19(3): 113-126.
[10] Searle J., (1980), Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3): 417-457.
[11] Searle J., (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
3Tristan Tzara and William S. Burroughs both famously utilised random acts (drawing a series of words
from a hat; cutting-up texts and randomly rearranging them, respectively). In the context of this essay it
is argued that the creativity here lies more in the artist’s decision to deploy a random processes centrally
within the creative act, rather than any Rorschach interpretations these processes eventually invoke.
4 J MARK BISHOP GOLDSMITHS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
[12] Torrance S., (2005), Thin Phenomenality and Machine Consciousness. In: Chrisley R, Clowes R, Tor-
rance S, (Eds). Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on Next Generation Approaches to Machine Conscious-
ness: Imagination, Development, Intersubjectivity and Embodiment, AISB’05 Convention. Hertfordshire:
University of Hertfordshire.
